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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff. Le Ann Schultz, instituted
District Court for personal
accident with defendant

this action in the

injuries sustained

Conger.

in a vehicular

At the time of the accident

Conger was a deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff who was engaged in
the scope and course of his employment and was serving "process
and notice."
Judge

The Third Judicial District Court, by and through

Leonard

Russon,

granted

defendant

Conger's

motion

to

dismiss on the ground that plaintiff-Schultz had failed to file
a notice of claim with Salt Lake County as required by Sections
63-30-11

and

14

Plaintiff-Schultz
Governmental

of

the

Utah

appeals.

(The

Governmental
relevant

Immunity Act are attached

Immunity

provisions

Act.

of

as Addendum A ) .

the
(The

Order of the District Court is attached as Addendum B ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case demonstrate the following:
1.
as

a

Office.
2.

On March 9, 1984 respondent Weldon Conger was employed
deputy

sheriff

with

the

in

the

Salt

Lake

County

Sheriff's

(R-2. 9. 13).
While

employment

serving

course

and

scope

of

and driving a vehicle, owned by and registered

his
to

Salt Lake County, he was involved in a two car accident with
the plaintiff, Le Ann Schultz.
3.

Approximately

six

(R-2, 9, 13).

weeks

later

Schultz's

insurance

carrier filed a proof of claim under Section 31-41-6, Utah Code
Annotated,

the

automobile

no-fault

law

then

in

effect,

for

possible

reimbursement

of Personal

the carrier had paid to Schultz.
4.

Injury

Protection

benefits

(R-34).

No claim was ever filed by Schultz with the Salt Lake

County Commission under the provisions of Sections 63-30-11 and
14 for

injuries

sustained

by Schultz

in the accident.

(R-8,

67; Schultz Brief p. 5 ) .
5.

Over nineteen months after

Schultz

filed

suit

for

personal

the cause of action arose

injuries

arising

accident in the Third Judicial District Court.
6.

out

the

(R-2, 11).

The action filed by Schultz was dimissed on motion for

failure

to

file

a notice

of

claim with

Salt

Lake County as

required by the notice provisions of the Governmental
Act.

of

Immunity

(R-65-69).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Governmental

operation
course
waived,

of

and

immunity

a

motor

scope

of

has

vehicle
his

plaintiff-Schultz

been

waived

driven

an

by

employment.—

for

the

employee

Immunity

was . therefore

negligent
in

having

required

to

the
been

file

a

notice of claim under the provisions of Sections 63-30-11 and
14 of the Immunity Act, not because driving an automobile is a
governmental function but because service of process and notice
is.
Having
claim,

the

failed

to file

District

Schultz's complaint.

the statutorily

Court

properly

required

dismissed

notice of
plaintiff-

The notice of claim filed by plaintiff's

1/ Section 63-30-7, Utah Code Annotated.

insurance
no-fault

carrier

statute did

Act; the carrier's
not

for

meet

the

Personal

Injury

Protection

under

not constitute notice under the

notice was for a different

statutorily

required

elements

the

Immunity

claim, and did

for

a

notice

of

claim.
Plaintiff's own failure to take any steps to ascertain that
the Governmental
when

she

excuse

knew

Immunity Act applied

a county-owned

plaintiff-Schultz

from

in this case, especially

vehicle

was

complying

involved,
with

the

does not
mandatory

notice requirements of the Immunity Act.
The constitutionality
previously been upheld

of the Governmental

Immunity Act has

by the court against challenges on the

grounds of protection and due process; the constitutionality of
the Act should again be sustained.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY HAS BEEN
INJURY
RESULTING
FROM
THE
OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE.

WAIVED FOR
NEGLIGENT

Deputy Sheriff Conger makes no claim of immunity from suit
under

the

caused
The

Governmental

by his negligent

plaintiff-Schultz

driving

Immunity

a

motor

operation

strenuously

vehicle

is

not

Act

for

injuries

allegedly

of a county-owned
argues
conduct

in

her

which

vehicle.

brief
is

that

uniquely

governmental and,o therefore. Deputy Conder should not be immune
from suit.

Conger does not disagree.

Deputy Conger is well aware, as Schultz apparently is not,
that immunity from suit has been waived under the Governmental

Immunity Act for injury sustained from the negligent
of a motor vehicle.

operation

Section 63-30-7 provides in relevant part:

"[ I Immunity from suit from all governmental entities is waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation of any
employee of a motor vehicle or other equipment during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of employment, or under
color of authority...."
Schultz has not named Salt Lake County as a defendant, but
has named Deputy Conger as a defendant in her claim for damages
under Section 63-30-4(3) of the Act which provides in relevant
part:
"(3) The remedy against a governmental
entity or its employee for an injury caused
by an act or omission which occurs during the
performance of such employee's duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority is...exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the same
subject matter against the employee...unless
the employee acted or failed to act through
fraud or malice."
Schultz's argument that driving a vehicle is not a uniquely
governmental activity
in an

attempt

to

ignores the statutory waiver of immunity

cloud

the

fact

that

she

failed

to

file a

notice of claim as required by Sections 63-30-11 and 14 of the
Immunity Act.
POINT II
THE SERVICE OF SUBPOENAS DURING THE SCOPE AND
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT BY A DEPUTY COUNTY
SHERIFF CONSTITUTES A "GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION."
In
whether

the

lower

Deputy

governmental

court,

Conger's

function

Schultz
conduct

for

which

never
of

raised

serving
he

and

the

issue

subpoenas
the

County

was

of
a

were

otherwise immune from suit under the provisions of the Immunity
Act.

Rather, her sole argument was, and on appeal continues to

be, that driving a vehicle is not an activity which is uniquely
governmental.
Schultz has also failed to recognize or raise at any point
in this case
statutorily
such

a

the broader

imposed

unique

governmental

duty

nature

agency

and
to

that

or

that

essential
serve

issue of whether

process
only

and

it

can

be

it

is essential

notice

"is of

performed
to

the

the

by a

core of

2/
governmental activity."—
Conger submits that the statutory duty to serve process and
notice meets

both

elements

set forth in Standiford.

of

the governmental

function

test

The sheriff is required by statute to

serve process and notice.

These terms are defined

in Section

17-22-1, U.C.A., as follows:
"•Process1
as used
in this chapter
includes all writs, warrants, summonses and
orders of the courts or justice or judicial
officers.
'Notice1 includes all papers and
orders, except
process, required
to be
served in any proceeding before any court,
board,
commission
or
officer,
or when
required by law to be served independently
of such proceedings."
The general duties of the sheriff are provided

in Section

17-22-2, which provides in relevant part:
"The sheriff shall:

&
Standiford
1236-1237 (1980).

v.

Salt

Lake

City

Corp..

605

P.2d

1230,

(9) Serve all process and notice in the
manner prescribed by law...."
Rule

4 of

the Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure

requires

in

part that:
"Every subpoena shall be issued by the
clerk under the seal of the court, shall
state the name of the court and the title of
the action, and shall command each person to
whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at a time and place therein specified.
The clerk shall issue a subpoena, or a
subpoena for the production of documentary
evidence, signed and sealed but otherwise in
blank, to a party requesting it, who shall
fill it in before service." (Emphasis added).
Rule 4 also provides
person

subject

rule.

It

subpoenas

to

should
that

that failure to obey a subpoena makes a

judicial
be

the

noted

contempt
that

judicial

proceedings

in large part

branch

of

it

government

under

this

is through
is able to

function in an orderly, efficient, and authoritative manner.
The duty of service of summons has been held to be obligatory and subject

3/
to the extraordinary writ of mandamus.—

In

Hamilton, the Oregon Court of Appeals interpreted that state's
statutes, which are similar to Utah's, regarding the sheriff's
duty to serve summons.
serve

summonses

private

was

individuals

In finding that the sheriff's duty to

mandatory,
over

the

regardless
years

of

18

of

the

could

fact
also

summons, the court held:
"We
hold
that
the
sheriff
has a
statutory duty to serve a summons in a
civil action and the duty is enforceable by
a writ of mandamus." Id. at 344.
1/ Hamilton v. Hamilton, 676 P.2d 341 (Or. App., 1984)

that
serve

The

court

in

Hamilton

also

found

that

even

though

private

individuals could serve summons that all service of summons was
governmental

in nature and governed by statute.

And while the

courts had power to direct the sheriff to serve summons, orders
and process, it had no such authority over private individuals.
That a private individual may also serve some process and
notice

does

not

alter

the

fact

that

these activities

relate

solely to judicial and quasi-judicial functions which are both
uniquely governmental and essential to the core of governmental
activity.
This court has held that it is axiomatic that a sheriff, in
appointing
official
1984).

deputy
duties.

sheriffs,
Snyder

is acting

v.

Cook,

It should also be axiomatic

in connection with his

688

P.2d

496,

that a sheriff

498

(Ut.

performing

his statutory duty of serving process and notice in connection
with

the

judicial

functions

of

state

government

is

also

an

official duty for which he is immune.
The court's reasoning in Borthick where it expounded on the
governmental

function test announced

in Standiford

in this case:
"Standiford's reference to activities
that 'can only be performed by a governmental agency1 does not preclude governmental immunity for supervisory functions
in some respects similar to those that
could be performed by a private association
authorized
by
agreements
such
as self
regulation
by
an
industry."
(Emphasis
added). Ld. at 631.

is germane

That a private individual may engage in conduct similar to
that prescribed for sheriffs does not preclude the finding of a
governmental function in the exercise of statutorily prescribed
duties by a deputy sheriff.
Conger
function

submits

of

that

service

he

was

of process

engaged
and

in

notice

the

governmental

in the course and

scope of his employment as a deputy county sheriff at the time
of the accident.
be totally
in

immune from suit except for the waiver of immunity

Section

vehicle.

Therefore, both he and the government would

63-30-7,

U.C.A.

However, plaintiff

for
failed

negligent

operation

of

a

to file a notice of claim

with the governmental entity as required

by the Immunity Act,

and Schultz's cause of action is now barred by the statute.
POINT III
THE FILING OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM WITH A
GOVERNMENTAL BODY OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IS A MANDATORY PREREQUISITE OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT PRIOR TO FILING
SUIT IN A DISTRICT COURT.
A.

PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO FILE THE MANDATORY NOTICE OF CLAIM
WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE TIME IN WHICH THE CAUSE OF ACTION
AROSE WAS FATAL TO PLAINTIFF'S ACTION.
THE TRIAL COURT'S
DISMISSAL OF HER LAWSUIT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
This court on numerous occasions has consistently held that

the filing of a claim with the governing body of a governmental
entity
that

under

failure

the
to

Governmental
do

so

Immunity

prohibits

the

Act

is mandatory

bringing

of

an

and

action

against the governmental entity or its employee.
In Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Ut. 1985), this court
determined

that

the

subject

cause

of

action

arose

under

a

waiver of immunity under the Governmental Immunity Act and held
the following regarding the statutory notice requirement:
"As the claim made by the plaintiff must
be considered under waiver from immunity
statutes, her claim is brought under the
provisions
of
the
Governmental
Immunity
Act.
As
such.
the
notice
of
claim
requirements contained in U.C.A., Section
63-30-13 are mandated and her failure to
comply with that provision bars her claim
against
Woodland
Hills."
Id.
at
279.
(Emphasis added).
In

accord

is

Roosendaal

Construction

& Mining

Corp.

v.

Holman, 28 U.2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (Ut. 1972), where this court
affirmed

the

Commission
defective

dismissal

on
in

the
that

of

a complaint

grounds
it

that

failed

to

the

against

the State Tax

complaint

allege

was

compliance

fatally
with

the

notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act.
Section 63-30-11(2), Utah Code Annotated

1953, as amended,

provides:
"Any person having a claim for injury
against a governmental entity or against an
employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority
shall,
before
maintaining
an
action, file a written notice of claim with
such entity."
Section

63-30-13,

Utah

Code

Annotated

1953,

as

also provides:
"A claim against a political subdivision
or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless
notice of claim is filed with the governing
body of a political subdivision within one
year after the claim arises...."
(Emphasis
added).

-9-

amended,

As in Roosendaal, the complaint filed by Schultz also fails
to

allege

Immunity

compliance
Act

and,

with

the

notice

therefore,

the

requirements

District

Court

of

the

properly

dismissed her action.
In Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Ut.
1980),

this

court

again upheld

the notice requirement

of the

Immunity Act and held:
"We think the Immunity Act is dispositive
in that Section 63-30-13 provides:
•A claim against a political
subdivision is barred unless notice
of claim is filed with the governing
body of the political subdivision
within one year after the cause of
action
arises 1 .
(Emphasis
the
court•s).
The record reflects that no such notice
was filed with the County Commission of
Uintah
County
any
time during
the year
following
appellant's
discovery
of
her
iniury, and hence the District Court was
correct in dismissing the complaint as to
Uintah County...with prejudice."
(Emphasis
added). Ld. at 354.
Schultz, having neither pled nor actually filed a notice of
claim with the governing body of the County as required by the
Immunity

Act,

is

barred

in

her

attempt

to

bring

an

action

against respondent Conger.
B.

THE CLAIM FILED BY SCHULTZ•S INSURANCE CARRIER FOR PERSONAL
INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS IS NOT A VALID NOTICE OF CLAIM
UNDER THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT.
Schultz concedes

that

she did not file a notice of claim

with Salt Lake County under

either Section

63-30-11 or 14 of

the Governmental Immunity Act (Brief, p. 5 ) . Having admittedly

failed

to comply with the notice requirements of the Act, she

nevertheless
company

argues

that

for Personal

31-41-6,

Utah

the

notice

filed

Injury Protection

Code

Annotated

purposes of the Immunity Act.

was

by

her

insurance

benefits under

sufficient

to

Section

meet

the

Her position is without merit.

The form letter constituting the claim filed by State Farm
does not meet the content requirements for notices as set forth
in Section 63-30-11(3) of the Act

in that

it was not signed;

not presented or signed by Schultz, her attorney, or her agent;
did

not

specify

any

damage

amount;

statement of facts substantiating
possible claim for reimbursement
claim

for

loss

of

did

not

set

forth

a

the claim; set forth only a
for PIP benefits; and made no

earnings,

special

damages,

suffering, nor for permanent, partial disability.

pain

and

(R-34).

It is well established under Utah law that a prerequisite
in

pursuing

compliance

a

claim

with

Immunity Act.

the

against
notice

a

governmental

requirements

of

entity
the

is

full

Governmental

Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d

480 (Ut. 1975); Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Ut. 1983).
In Scarborough, the plaintiff sued Granite School District
to recover
school

for

injuries

playground.

The

suffered
trial

by her

court

son

dismissed

in a fall
the

complaint,

finding that the action was barred due to plaintiff's
to file a notice of claim as required
the

Immunity Act.

on a

failure

by Section 63-30-13 of

On appeal, plaintiff unsuccessfully

argued

that although there was no literal compliance with the statute
in the usual

form or sense, there was substantial

-11-

compliance

and

a

sufficient

requirements

of

"filing"

the

of

statute.

a

claim

In affirming

to

satisfy

the

dismissal

the
of

plaintiff's action the Utah Supreme Court held:
"The school district
is a political
subdivision
of the state.
Therefore it
would normally be immune from suit; and the
right to sue is an exception created by
statute.
We have consistently held that
where a cause of action is based upon a
statute, full compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right
to maintain a suit. In order to so meet the
requirements of the statute quoted above and
fulfill its intended purpose, the 'filing'
of a claim should include these essentials:
that it be in writing; that it contain a
brief statement of the facts and the nature
of the claim asserted; that it be subscribed
by the party required to give it and who
intends to rely on it; that it be directed
to and delivered to someone authorized to or
responsible for receiving it; and that this
be done within the prescribed time." Id., at
482. (Emphasis added).
Clearly the notice submitted by Schultz's insurance carrier
for

PIP

claim

benefits

from

was

plaintiff's

for

an

entirely

subsequent

claim

separate

and

distinct

as

contained

in her

31-41-11

in effect

at the

complaint.
The Utah No-Fault
time

this

action

Act, Section

arose and under which

the insurance

carrier

filed its notice, provides that (in this case) State Farm shall
be reimbursed

by Salt Lake County or if there is "an issue of

liability for such reimbursement
be

decided

by

mandatory,

and the amount of same shall

binding

arbitration

between

the

insurers."
This court has made it clear that State Farm does not even
have a subrogation right to PIP funds claimed by its insured.

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Ut. 1980).

The

insurance carrier fs only right to such funds is created by the
above-referenced

statute

and

must

be

sought

feasor or the tort-feasor's insurance carrier.

from

the

tort-

The only way to

enforce the right of reimbursement is through arbitration.

The

claim presented by State Farm therefore could not be and is not
a notice

on behalf

of

the plaintiff

for her claims over and

above the no-fault PIP funds requested by the insurance carrier.
The insurance carrier cannot be plaintiff's agent

inasmuch

as the insurance carrier has no authority to represent Schultz
in the collection
above

the

PIP

of her personal

benefits.

Her

claim

for damages over and

insurance

carrier

has no

legal

interest or obligation under its insurance contract to do so.
C.

SCHULTZ'S FAILURE TO DISCOVER CONGER'S STATUS AS A DEPUTY
COUNTY SHERIFF DOES NOT TOLL THE MANDATORY NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF THE IMMUNITY ACT.
Plaintiff's

and

another

accident

Salt

Lake

was

investigated

County

Deputy

by

Sheriff.

both

Sandy City

Both

accident

reports clearly indicate that the vehicle driven by Conger was
owned

by

and

registered

46).

Schultz's argument

to Salt

Lake County.

(R-43

through

that she was unaware that Conger was

acting in the course and scope of his employment because he was
not

in uniform and

the county vehicle was unmarked

is simply

unpersuasive.
Schultz had one year in which to investigate and discover
the

facts

Schultz's

needed

to

insurance

file

a claim with

carrier

only

-13-

six

the county.
weeks

to

It took

review

the

accident and file a notice with the Salt Lake County Commission
for personal injury protection under the Utah no-fault law then
in

effect.

nineteen

(R-34).

months

When

later,

Schultz

she

did

did

aver

file
in

her

action

paragraph

over

3 of

her

complaint:
"Weldon Conger, struck her vehicle from
the rear while operating a vehicle for Salt
Lake County." (Emphasis added). R-2.
It

is obvious

that

the

information

necessary

for

Schultz

to

ascertain that Salt Lake County and a Deputy Salt Lake County
Sheriff were

involved

in this accident were readily available

based upon Schultz1s insurance company's prompt action and her
own averments
pursue

her

in her complaint.

cause

of

action

She simply

and

failed

to

failed

to timely

comply

with

the

necessary filing requirements.
This
involving

court
the

rejected
notice

a

similar

requirements

argument
of

the

in

another

Immunity

Act.

case
The

court held:
"Southworth cannot now validly contend
that he did not know, or should have known,
of State's alleged negligence withrespect
to his affirmative claim against State when
he was present at and involved in this
accident.
He could at the time of the
accident, or within one year thereafter,
have determined
the absence of warning
signs
on
the
highway,
which
is
the
predicate of his claim on appeal. Sears v.
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Ut. 1977).
(Emphasis added).
Schultz,
accident
the

in

this

or within

ownership

of

case,

one year
the

also

could,

thereafter,

vehicle

by

Salt

at

the

time

of

have determined
Lake

County,

and

the
both
the

status

of

Conger

as

a Deputy

Sheriff

and

complied

with

the

notice requirements of the Immunity Act.
In Varoz v. Salt Lake County. 506 P.2d 435 (Ut. 1973), this
court upheld the requirement of notice even where the claimant
had

been

misinformed

about

question and had mistakenly

the

ownership

filed

of

the

road

in

a notice of claim with the

state rather than the county.

The court held that his notice

to the county which was filed

late was fatal to his case and

upheld the dismissal of his action by the trial court.
The record is void of any reason other than plaintiff's own
lack of knowledge and her own failure to take any action which
would

reveal

the

requirement.
the part
statute

necessity

Such dilatory

of plaintiff
or

void

the

of

complying

action

is not

and

failure

sufficient

compliance

of

with

the

to proceed

grounds

the

notice

to toll

notice

of

on
the

claim

requirements of the statute.
Plaintiff
Conger

was

employment
for

attempts

actually

The

call

engaged

in

into
the

question
scope

at the time of the accident.

the first

court.

to

time on appeal and

whether

Deputy

course

of his

and

This point is raised

is not properly

before the

Yates, supra, at 354.
record

is

absolutely

uncontroverted

by

Schultz

that

Conger at the time of the accident was:
(a)

employed as a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff;

(b)

on

process

and

duty

performing

notice

during

employment; and (R-2, 9, 13).

the

statutory

the

course

duty

and

of

scope

serving
of

his

(c)
County.

driving a vehicle owned by and registered to Salt Lake
(R-2, 9, 13, 43, 45).

The court

is bound

by the record

on appeal on this issue

and should not be misled by the mere speculations of plaintiff
regarding

the

documented

and

unrefuted

status

of

deputy

Conger's on-duty activities.
POINT IV
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
TIONAL IN ALL REGARDS.
This

court has previously upheld

the Governmental

IS CONSTITUthe constitutionality

of

Immunity Act in Madsen v, Borthick, supra, by

adopting the reasoning of the Kansas Supreme Couct in the case
of

Brown

1976).

v.
In

Wichita
Brown

constitutionality
against

challenges

State
the

of

its
that

University:,

Kansas
state's
it

547

Supreme

P.2d

Court

Governmental

violated

the

105

(Kan.

upheld

the

Immunity

Act

egual

protection

guarantees of the constitution and also violated rights of due
process.
This court in Borthick held:
"Sovereign immunity--the principle that
the state cannot be sued in its own courts
without
its
consent—was
a well
settled
principle of American common law at the time
Utah became a state.
(Citations omitted).
Article
I,
Section
11
of
the
Utah
Constitution,
which
prescribes
that
all
courts shall be open and persons shall not be
barred from using them to address injuries,
was not meant to create a new remedy or a new
right
of
action.
(Citations
omitted).
Conseguently, Article I, Section 11 makes no
change
in
the
principle
of
sovereign
immunity,
and
sovereign
immunity
is not
unconstitutional under that section.
It was
so held in Brown v. Wichita State University

(citations omitted), which involved a similar
provision of the Kansas Constitution.
We
concur in the reasoning and result of that
decision."

Id. at 629.

This court has specifically upheld the constitutionality of
the

Governmental

protection

of

Immunity

the

laws

Act

whereas

on

the

in

this

grounds
case,

of

equal

the

notice

requirement had been challenged. Sears v. Southworth, 563 P. 2d
192

(Ut. 1977).

In Southworth,

as

in the present

case, the

plaintiff there argued that the notice of claim requirements of
the

Immunity

both

Act violated

the federal

rational

basis

and

the equal

protection

state constitution.

for

the

notice

provisions of

This court

requirement

and

found a

upheld

the

constitutionality of the statute.
Schultz contends that Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co.,
78 U. 39, 300 P. 1040 (Ut. 1931) validates her claim that the
Immunity

Act violates

her rights to due process.

As already

discussed, in Borthick, the court has previously held that the
enactment of the Governmental Immunity Act does not violate the
constitutional

provision

that

all

courts

are

to be open and

persons not barred from using them to address injuries.
In Buttrey,
which

had

there had been a statutory change

precluded

case got to trial.
no

change

in

maintaining

of action by the the time her

However, in the present case there has been

the

her

her right

in the law

law

cause

of

which

would

action.

The

preclude
only harm

Schultz

from

suffered

by

Schultz is her failure to timely discover the facts surrounding
her

injuries

and

timely

Governmental Immunity Act.

file

her

notice

as

required

by

the

This statute has been before the court numerous times since
the constitutionality of the statute was upheld in Sears nearly
ten years ago.
its

The statute has been applied,

constitutionality

another

again

constituional

upheld.

challenge

The

to

a

interpreted and

court's

state

analysis of

statute

is

most

helpful:
"There are certain principles of law
relating to the validity of statutes which
have a bearing on the problem of constitutionality here presented.
The first and
foundational one is that the prerogative of
the legislature as the creators of the law
is to be respected.
Consequently,
its
enactments are accorded a presumption of
validity; and the courts do not strike down
a legislative act unless the interests of
justice in the particular case before it
require doing so because the act is clearly
in conflict with the higher law as set
forth in the Constitution.
It is noteworthy that the statute under
consideration has previously been involved
in cases before this Court under differing
circumstances and has not been declared
unconstitutional. With respect thereto, we
see no persuasive reason to disagree with
[the]
propositions
supportive
of
the
validity of the statute...."
Zamora v.
Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Ut. 1981).
The
ality

of

decided

issues

raised

by

Schultz

regarding

the statute have previously

the

constitution-

been raised, heard, and

in favor of the Act; the Governmental

Immunity Act is

constitutional in all regards.
CONCLUSION
Respondent-Conger
previous

decisions

Governmental

respectfully
upholding

Immunity

Act

are

submits

the

that

this

constitutionality

controlling

in

this

court's
of

the

case.

Further, compliance with the notice requirements of the Act are
mandatory

in

governmental

this

case

because

Conger

was

engaged

in

the

function of service of process and notice in the

scope and course of his employment

as a deputy county sheriff

at the time plaintiff's cause of action arose.
Plaintiff-Schultz's failure to file a notice of claim under
the provisions of the Act preclude the bringing of her action
and

the order of the District

Court dismissing

her cause for

failure to file such notice should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1986.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Acting Salt Lake County Attorney

By
PAUL G. MAUGHAN
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the Respondent's Brief
were served upon John Spencer Snow, Attorney for Appellant, at
261 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

day of

December, 1986.
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operation of motor vehicles - Exception.
63-30-3. Waiver of immunity for injury ciused by
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous
or defective public building, structure, or other public
improvement - Exception.
63-30-10. Waiver of immumtv for injury caused by
negligent act or omission of employee • Exceptions Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights.
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice • Cor en is Service - Legal disability.
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee - Time for
filing notice.
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its
employee - Time for filing notice.
63-30-14. Claim for injury - Approval or denial by
governmental entity or insurance carrier within ninety
days.
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury - Authority and
time for filing action against governmental entity
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions Application of Rules of Civil Procedure
63-30-17. Venue of actions.
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions.
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action.
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity ban
action against employee.
63-30-21. Repealed.
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited •
Governmental entity exempt from execution, attachment
or garnishment.
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against state Presentment for payment.
63-30-24. Payment of daira or judgment against political
subdivision - Procedure by governing body
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against political
subdivision - Installment payments.
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or
purchase of insurance created by political subdivisions.
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment
of daims, judgments, or insurance premiums
63-30-2*. Liability insurance - Purchase or
self-insurance by governmental entity authorized •
Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance.
63-30-29. Repealed.
63-30-29 5. Liability insurance • Government vehicles
operated by employees outside scope of employment.
63-30-30. Repealed.
63-30-31. Liability insurance • Construction of polio
not in compliance with act.
63-30-32. Liability insurance - Methods for purchase or
63-30-33. Liability insurance - Insurance for employees
authorized - No right to indemnification or contribution
from governmental agency.
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against governmental
entity or employee - Insurance coverage exception.
63-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan • Providing
coverage • Expenses of attorney general in representing
slate or employees.
63-30-36. Defending government employee • Request Cooperation - Payment of judgment.
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs
by government employee.
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by
employee not required.
63-30-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act."
1965
63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(1) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes
any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university
or other instrumentality of the state;
(2) "Political subdivision" means any county, city,
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town, school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or taxing
district, or other governmental subdivision or public
corporation,
(3) "Governmental entity' means the state and us
political subdivisions as defined herein,
(4) 'Employee" means any officer, employee, or
servant of a governmental entity, whether or not
compensated, including student teachers certificated
in accordance with section 53-2-15, educational
aides, students engaged in providing services to
members of the public in the course of an approved
medical, nursing, or other professional health care
clinical training program, volunteers and tutors,
(5) "Claim means any claim or cause of action
for money or damages against a governmental entity
or against an employee,
(6) "Injury' means death, injury to a person,
damage to or loss oi propertv, or any other injury
that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private
person or his agent,
(7) 'Personal injury' means an injury of any kind
other than property damage,
(8) 'Property damage means injury to, or loss
of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property
ins
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from
suit.
Except as mav be otherwise provided in this
chapter, ail governmental entities are immune from
suit tor anv injury which results from the exercise of
a governmental function, governmentailv-owned
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental
health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical
training program conducted in either public or
private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction, repair, and
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental
functions, and governmental entities and their otfleers and employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those activities
ms
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as
admission or denial of liability - Effect of waiver
of immunity - Exclusive remedy - Joinder of
employee - Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility in so tar
as governmental entities or their employees are
concerned. If immunity from suit is waived by this
chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability
of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were
a private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as
adversely affecting any immunity from suit which a
governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or
its employee for an injury caused by an act or
omission which occurs during the performance of
such employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is, after the etfective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject
matter against the employee or the estate of the
employee whose act or omission gave nse to the
claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act
through fraud or malice.
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(4) A n employee m a y be joined in an action
against a governmental entity in a representative
capacity if the act or omission complained of is one
for which the governmental entity m a y b e liable, but
n o employee m a y be held personally liable for acts
0 r omissions occurring during t h e performance of
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment o r under color of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted o r failed t o act due to
fraud or malice.
19«3
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as t o contractual
obligations.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived as to a n y contractual obligation. Actions
arising out of contractual rights o r obligations shall
not be subject t o the requirements of Sections 6330-11, 63-30-12. 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 6 3 30-15, or 63-30-19.
19*5
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as t o actions
involving property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of a n y property real or
personal or for the possession thereof or t o quiet
title thereto, o r to foreclose mortgages o r other liens
thereon or t o determine a n y adverse claim thereon,
or secure any adjudication touching a n y mortgage
or other lien said entity m a y have or claim o n the
property involved.
1965
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from
negligent operation of motor vehicles Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation by any- employee of a m o t o r vehicle o r other
equipment during the performance of his duties,
within t h e scope of employment, o r under color of
authority; provided, however, that this section shall
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as
defined by law a n d while being driven in accordance
with the requirements of section 41-6-14.
19*3
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused
by defective, unsafe, o r dangerous condition of
highways, bridges, o r other structures.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe,
or dangerous condition of a n y highway, road,
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel,
bridge, viaduct or other structure located thereon.
1965

63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from
dangerous o r defective public building, structure,
or other public improvement - Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous o r
defective condition of any public building, structure,
dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for latent defective conditions.
1965

63-30-11.

mental anguish, or civil rights; o r
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
or
(d) arises out of a failure t o make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or
negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution
of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if
malicious or without probable cause; or
( 0 arises out of a misrepresentation by the
employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful
assemblies, public demonstrations, m o b violence,
and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person
in any state prison, county, or city jail or other
place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state
lands or the result of any activity authorized by the
State Land Board; or
(1) arises out of the activities of providing
emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, handling
hazardous materials, or emergency evacuations.
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused or
arising out of a violation of protected fourth amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78
which shall be the exclusive remedy for injunes t o
those protected rights. If Section 78-16-5 or
Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2)
shall be void and governmental entities shall remain
immune from suit for violations of fourth amendment rights.
1915
63-30-11. O a i m for injury - Notice • Contents
• Service - Legal disability.

(1) A claim is deemed to arise when the statute o f
limitations that would apply if the claim were
against a private person commences to run.
(2) A n y person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity or against an employee for a n
act or omission occurring during the performance of
his duties, within t h e scope of employment, o r
under color of authority shall, before maintaining
an action, file a written notice of claim with such
entity.
(3) T h e notice of claim shall set forth a brief statement of the facts, the nature of the claim asserted,
and the damages incurred by the claimant so far as
they are known, shall b e signed by the person
making the claim or such person's agent, attorney,
parent or legal guardian, a n d shall b e directed a n d
delivered t o t h e responsible governmental entity in
the manner a n d within the time prescribed in section
63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as applicable.
(4) If, at the time the claim arises, the claimant is
under the age of majority, o r mentally incompetent
and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned, upon
application by t h e claimant a n d after hearing a n d
notice t o the governmental entity the court, in its
discretion, m a y extend the time for service of notice
of claim; b u t in n o event shall it grant an extension
which exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
In determining whether t o grant an extension, the

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused
by negligent act o r omission of employee Exceptions - Waiver for injury caused by
violation of fourth a m e n d m e n t rights.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission o f a n employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises o u t of the exercise o r performance o r
*he failure t o exercise or perform a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused; or
(b) arises o u t of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intenttonal trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of
*<*o, ut«h
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court shall consider whether the delay in serving the
notice o f claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense o n the
merits.
19§3
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee Time for filing notice.
A claim against the state or its employee for an
act or omission occurring during the performance o f
his duties, within the scope o f employment, or
under color o f authority, is barred unless notice o f
claim is filed with the attorney general and the
agency concerned within o n e year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension o f
time granted under subsection 63-30-11 (4).
19*3
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or
its employee - Time for filing notice.
A claim against a political subdivision or against
its employee for an act or omission occurring during
the performance o f his duties, within the scope o f
employment, or under color of authority, is barred
unless notice o f claim is filed with the governing
body o f the political subdivision within o n e year
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of
any extension o f time granted under subsection 6330-11(4).
19«3
63-30-14. Claim for injury - Approval or denial
by governmental entity or insurance carrier within
ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing o f a claim the
governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall act
thereon and notify the claimant in writing o f its
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have
been denied if at the end o f the ninety-day period
the governmental entity or its insurance earner has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
1965
63-30-15. Denial o f claim for injury - Authority
and time for filing action against governmental
entity.
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an
action in the district court against the governmental
entity or an employee o f the entity. The action must
be commenced within one year after denial or the
denial period as specified in this chapter.
ins
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over
actions - Application of Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The district courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over any action brought under this
chapter, and such actions shall be governed by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are
consistent with this chapter.
i9*j
63-30-17. Venue of actions.
Actions against the state may be brought in the
county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake
County. Actions against a county may be brought in
the county in which the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a district
court judge of the defendant county, in any county
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be
granted ex parte. Actions against all other political
subdivisions including cities and towns, shall be
brought in the county in which the political subdivision is located or in the county in which the claim
arose.
19*3
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement o f actions.
A political subdivision, after conferring with its
legal officer or other legal counsel if it has n o such
officer, may compromise and settle any action as to
the damages or other relief sought.
The risk manager in the department o f administrative services may compromise and settle any claim
398
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for damages filed against the state up to and including 510,000 for which the risk management fund
may be liable, and may, with the concurrence of the
attorney general or his representative and the executive director o f the department o f administrative
services, compromise and settle a claim for damages
in excess of $10,000 for which the risk management
fund may be liable.
i9§3
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in
action.

At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but
in n o case less than the sum of $300, conditioned
upon payment by the plaintiff o f taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to
recover judgment.
1965
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity
bars action against employee.
Judgment against a governmental entity in an
action brought under this act shall constitute a
complete bar to any action by the claimant, by
reason of the same subject matter, against the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim.

1965

63-30-21. Repealed.
197S
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages
prohibited • Governmental entity exempt from
execution, attachment or garnishment.
N o judgment shall be rendered against the governmental entity for exemplary or punitive damages;
nor shall execution, attachment or garnishment issue
against the governmental entity.
1965
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against
state - Presentment for payment.
Any claim approved by the state as defined by
subsection 63-30-2(5) or any final judgment obtained against the state shall be presented to the state
risk manager, or to the office, agency, institution or
other instrumentality involved for payment, if
payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law. If such payment is not authorized by
law then said judgment or claim shall be presented
to the board o f examiners and the board shall
proceed as provided in section 63-6-10.
19*3
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against
political subdivision - Procedure by governing
body.

Any claim approved by a political subdivision or
any final judgment obtained against a political
subdivision shall be submitted to the governing body
thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds
of said political subdivision unless said funds are
appropriated to some other use or restricted by law
or contract for other purposes.
1965
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against
political subdivision - Installment payments.
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or
award during the current fiscal year it may pay the
claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual
installments o f equal size or in such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant.
1965
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or
purchase of insurance created by political
subdivisions.
Any political subdivision may create and maintain
a reserve fund or may jointly with o n e or more
other political subdivisions make contributions to a
joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making
payment o f claims against the co-operating subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to this
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chapter, or for the purpose of purchasing liability
insurance to protect the co-operating subdivisions
from any or all risks created by this chapter.
1983
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for
payment of claims, judgments, or insurance
premiums.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, ail political subdivisions shall have authority to levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay
any claims, settlements, or judgments, or to pay the
costs to defend against same, or for the purpose of
establishing and maintaining a reserve fund for the
payment of such claims, settlements, or judgments
as may be reasonably anticipated; and there is
hereby specifically included any judgment against an
elected official or employee of any political subdivision, including peace officers based upon a claim
for punitive damages, provided, that the authority
of a political subdivision for the payment of such
judgments for punitive damages is limited in any
individual case to S 10,000. It is hereby declared to
be the legislative intent that the payments authorized
for punitive damage judgments is money spent for a
public purpose within the meaning of this section
and Article XIII, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution; or to
pay the premium for such insurance as authorized,
even though as a result of such levy the maximum
levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded;
provided, that in no event shall such levy exceed
.0001 nor shall the revenues derived therefrom be
used for any other purpose than those stipulated
herein.
ms
63-30-28. Liability insurance - Purchase or
self-insurance by governmental entity authorized
- Establishment of trust accounts for
self-insurance.
Any governmental entity within the state may
purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or selfinsure and purchase excess commercial insurance in
excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against
any risk created or recognized by this chapter or any
action for which a governmental entity or its employee may be held liable.
In addition to any other reasonable means of selfinsurance, a governmental entity may self-insure
with respect to specified classes of claims by establishing a trust account under the management of an
independent private trustee having authority with
respect to claims of that character to expend both
principal and earnings of the trust account solely to
pay the costs of investigation, discovery, and other
pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys'
fees, and to pay all sums for which the governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for which a
compromise settlement may be agreed upon. The
monies and interest earned on said trust fund shall
be subject to investment pursuant to Chapter 7,
Title 51, the State Money Management Act of 1974,
and shall be subject to audit by the state auditor.
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust
agreement between the governmental entity and the
trustee may authorize the trustee to employ counsel
to defend actions against the entity and its employees and to protect and safeguard the assets of the
trust, to provide for claims investigation and adjustment services, to employ expert witnesses and
consultants, and to provide such other services and
functions necessary and proper to carry out the
Purposes of the trust.
19S5
63-30-29. Repealed.
19*3
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63-30-29.5. Liability insurance - Government
vehicles operated by employees outside scope of
employment.
A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven
by employees of the governmental entity with the
express or implied consent of the entity, but which,
at the time liability is incurred as a result of an
automobile accident, is not being driven and used
within the course and scope of the driver's employment is considered to provide the driver with the
insurance coverage required by Chapter 12A, Title
41. However, the liability coverages considered
provided are the minimum limits under Section 31A22-304.
IMS
63-30-30. Repealed.
W7t
63-30-31. Liability insurance - Construction of
policy not in compliance with act.
Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement hereafter issued and purchased to insure against any risk
which may arise as a result of the application of this
chapter, which contains any condition or provision
not in compliance with the requirements of the
chapter, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, but
shall be construed and applied in accordance with
such conditions and provisions as would have
applied had such policy, rider or endorsement been
in full compliance with this chapter, provided the
policy is otherwise valid.
i9fj
63-30-32. Liability insurance - Methods for
purchase or renewal.
N o contract or policy of insurance may be purchased or renewed under this chapter except upon
public bid to be let to the lowest and best bidder;
except that the purchase or renewal of insurance by
the state shall be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of sections 63-56-1 through 63-5673.

19*3

63-30-33. Liability insurance • Insurance for
employees authorized - N o right to
indemnification or contribution from
governmental agency.
A governmental entity may insure any or all of its
employees against liability, in whole or in p a n , for
injury or damage resulting from an act or omission
occurring during the performance of an employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under
color of authority, regardless of whether or not said
entity is immune from suit for said act or omission,
and any expenditure for such insurance is for a
public purpose. The insurer under any contract or
policy o f insurance pursuant to this section shall
have n o right to indemnification or contribution
from the governmental entity or its employee with
respect to any loss or liability covered by the contract or policy.
19*3
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against
governmental entity or employee - Insurance
coverage exception.
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), if a
judgment for personal injury against a governmental
entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one
person in any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two
or more persons in any one occurrence, the court
shall reduce the judgment to that amount.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), if a
judgment for property damage against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental
entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in
any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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(3) If a governmental entity has secured insurance
coverage in excess o f the amounts set forth in subsections (1) and (2), the court shall reduce the
amount of the judgment or award to a sum equal to
the applicable limits of the insurance coverage.
1983
63-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan Providing coverage - Expenses of attorney
general in representing state or employees.
(1) After consultation with appropriate state agencies, the risk manager in the department of administrative services shall provide a comprehensive
liability plan, with limits not lower than those set
forth in section 63-30-34, which will protect the
state and its indemnified employees from claims and
liability. Deductibles and maximum limits of coverage shall be determined by the risk manager in
consultation with the director of administrative
services.
(2) The risk manager may expend funds from the
risk management fund established in section 63-147, to procure and provide coverage to all state
agencies and their indemnified employees, except
those specifically exempted by law, and shall apportion the cost of such coverage in accordance with
section 63-1-47. Unless specifically authorized by
statute to do s o , including subsection 63-1-47(9),
no agency other than the risk manager may procure
or provide liability insurance for the state.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 675-3 or any other provision of this code, the state
attorney general may bill the department of administrative services for all costs and legal fees expended
by the attorney general, including attorneys' and
secretarial salaries, in representing the state or any
indemnified employee against any claim for which
the risk management fund may be liable and in
advising state agencies and employees regarding such
claims. The risk manager shall draw funds from the
risk management fund for this purpose.
iw
63-30-36. Defending government employee Request - Cooperation - Payment of judgment.
(1) Before a governmental entity may defend its
employee against a claim, the employee must make
a written request to the governmental entity to
defend him and must make it within ten days after
service of process upon him or within such longer
period as would not prejudice the governmental
entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf, or
conflict with notice requirements imposed on the
entity in connection with insurance carried by the
entity relating to the risk involved. If the employee
fails to make a request or fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, the governmental entity is not
required to defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement against the employee in respect to the claim.
(2) If a governmental entity conducts the defense
of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay
any judgment based upon or any compromise or
settlement of the claim except as provided in subsection (3).
(3) A governmental entity may conduct the
defense of an employee under an agreement with the
employee that the government entity reserves the
right not to pay the judgment, compromise, or settlement unless it is established that the claim arose
out o f an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of his
employment, or under color o f authority.
19«3
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense
costs by government employee.

(1) Subject to subsection (2), if an employee pays
a judgment entered against him, or any portion of
it, which the governmental entity is required to pay
under section 63-30-36, the employee is entitled
to recover the amount of such payment and the
reasonable costs incurred in his defense from the
governmental entity.
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the
defense of an employee against a claim, or does
conduct the defense under an agreement as provided
in subsection 63-30-36(3), the employee may
recover from the governmental entity under subsection (1) if:
(a) The employee establishes that the act or
omission upon which the judgment is based occurred during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of his employment, or under color of authority, and that he conducted the defense in good
faith; and
(b) The governmental entity does not establish
that the injury or damage resulted from the fraud or
malice of the employee.
19«
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity
by employee not required.
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a
judgment based on or a compromise or settlement
of a claim against the governmental entity or an
employee, the employee may not be required to
indemnify the governmental entity for the payment.
I9S3

Chapter 30a. Reimbursement of Legal
Fees and Costs to Officers and Employees
63-30a-l. Definitions.
63-30a-2. Indictment or information against officer or
employee - Reimbursement of attorneys' fees and court
costs incurred in defense.
63-30i-3. Request for defense or reimbursement.
63-30a-l. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Officer or employee* means any individual
who at the time of an event giving rise to a claim
under this act is or was elected or appointed to or
employed by a public entity, whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent contractor.
(2) "Public entity" means the state or any political
subdivision o f it or any office, department, division,
board, agency, commission, council, authority,
institution, hospital, school, college, university, or
other instrumentality of the state or any such political subdivision.
1977
63-30a-2. Indictment or information against
officer or employee - Reimbursement of
attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in
defense.
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information
is filed against an officer or employee, in connection
with or arising out of any act or omission of that
officer or employee during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of his employment or under
color o f his authority, and that indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or results in a judgment o f acquittal, unless the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed upon application or
motion o f the prosecuting attorney, that officer or
employee shall be entitled to recover from the public
entity reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs
necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment
or information.
I9f3

AA A

4UU

UTAH CODE
1986-1987

Code • Co

For ANNOTATIONS, please consult the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Prove, urn

~——J

T.J. "TED" CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: LOUIS E. MIDGLEY (2256)
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Defendants
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LE ANN R. SCHULTZ,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
Civil No. C-85-7163
WELDON CONGER,
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
Defendant.

Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss having come on regularly
for hearing on the 24th day of February, 1986, before the
undersigned, and L. E. Midgley, Esq., appearing in behalf of
defendants and John Spencer Snow, Esq., appearing in behalf of
the plaintiff, and arguments of counsel having been heard and
the memoranda submitted by the parties having heretofor been
reviewed by the Court, and the Court having found that the
defendant Conger at the time of the accident in question which
occurred on March 9, 1984, was employed as a deputy sheriff
without uniform for the Salt Lake County Sherifffs Office and
was driving an unmarked vehicle registered to Salt Lake County ;

that the plaintiff failed to file a Notice of Claim as
provided under the provisions of 63-30-11 (2) (3) U.C.A.
within the time prescribed by said statute; that the notice
filed by the plaintiff's insurance company was insufficient;
and that the Complaint filed herein was filed after the
statute of limitations had expired under the provisions of
the Governmental Immunity Act; and the Court having found that
the defendants1 Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed
that plaintiff's Complaint be and the same is herewith
dismissed with prejudice,.,
DATED this

/ /

J

day of

f7^'&>*t&^

1986.

BY THE COURT:

LEONARD H. RUSSON,-District jQdge

ATTEST
H. DIXCN HiNDLEY

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Attorney ^for

Plaintiffs

By '

Deputy Ofer*

